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THE SOCIAL MEDIA THICKET FOR MISSISSIPPI LAWYERS:
SURVIVING AND THRIVING IN AN
ETHICAL TANGLED WEB*
Michael H. Rubin*
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ETHICAL ISSUES
When more than half of all in-house counsel report using social media
for news and information, when 81-year old Rupert Murdoch uses Twitter,
when the fastest growing cohort on Facebook are those over fifty, when the
Association of Corporate Counsel has a user group on LinkedIn, and when
bloggers regularly break important stories and appear on television and
radio news broadcasts, there can be no doubt that social media permeates
society. No lawyer can afford to ignore social media.
Lawyers and law firms are increasingly using social media today to
build their reputations, to inform their current clients, and to reach poten-
tial new clients.
Can the use of social media create ethical problems for attorneys?
Can lawyers inadvertently back themselves into ethical corners? This Pa-
per considers several examples, all of which are based on or stem from real
events. The purpose of these examples is not to scare anyone into aban-
doning social media; rather, the purpose is to make us more aware of the
issues involved and to think through why and how we use social media.
Further, the purpose of this Paper is not to answer questions, but to pose
them so that we all may consider them in more detail, particularly as these
rules may have been adopted, adapted, and interpreted in Mississippi as
well as other states.
Use of social media by lawyers triggers a number of potential ethical
concerns, including:
Can the use of social media by an attorney constitute the practice of
law?
What are the inadvertent unlawful practice of law issues if your social
media postings are viewed in a state where you are not licensed to
practice?
Can the use of social media lead to inadvertent attorney-client
relationships?
When does use of social media constitute advertising?
* A portion of this Paper consists of extracts from the author's prior publications, including:
The Social Media Thicket: Surviving and Thriving in the Tangled, Thorny Issues, 26 Prob. & Prop. J. 62
(2012); and The Social Media Thicket: Surviving and Thriving in a Tangled Web and the Ethical Issues
this Raises for Lawyers, ACREL/ALI-ABA WEBINAR, produced in conjunction with the American
College of Real Estate Lawyers, September 14, 2011.
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Can the use of social media lead to sanctions for litigators, and what
are the First Amendment issues of the use of social media vs. a lawyer's
obligations as an officer of the court?
Who has "ownership" of social media information when a lawyer
leaves a firm?
II. CAN THE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA BY AN ATrORNEY CONSTITUTE
THE PRACTICE OF LAW?
A. The Case of the Tech-Savvy Lawyer
Lucy Lawyer has a Facebook page linked to her Twitter account and
her blog. She updates items daily. She posts her thoughts on recent cases,
on legal issues, and even has a section of each post entitled "Practical Tips"
where she gives specific advice related to the issues about which she is
posting.
Lucy recently had a post on foreclosure issues, the problems lenders
have encountered in cases, and how borrowers have stopped foreclosure
proceedings. Included in her "Practical Tips" section is this statement:
Always check the public records. If the entity that is
suing you is not listed on the public records as the owner of
your note, you can have a claim against them on numerous
theories, including fraud on the court, misrepresentation,
and, perhaps, even RICO!
Is Lucy's post something that would constitute the "practice of law"?
What if Lucy's post also had a "sample pleading" section that readers
could use to draft oppositions to foreclosures?
B. Discussion About the Case of the Tech-Savvy Lawyer
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("RPC") do not de-
fine the practice of law. Because lawyers are licensed in each state, one
must look to each state's statutes and court rules to determine what consti-
tutes the practice of law. Mississippi defines the practice of law as "any
person holding himself out as a practicing attorney or occupying any posi-
tion in which he may be called upon to give legal advice or counsel or to
examine the law or to pass upon the legal effect of any act, document or
law."'
While many cases deal with attempted unlawful practice of law issues
from the standpoint of non-lawyers attempting to represent others in court,
fewer cases deal with transactional law issues. Nonetheless, it is instructive
to look at a sampling of opinions on transactional law.
1. Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-3-120 (2012).
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For example, Rhode Island's Bar has issued a report indicating that a
non-lawyer who advertised on the Internet as a "low cost paralegal" for
document preparation had engaged in the unlawful practice of law.2
Massachusetts has held that certain matters involving real estate clos-
ing and transactional work constitute the practice of law.3 This rule is
broadly accepted in other states. See, for example, opinions in Arkansas,'
Ohio,s Delaware,6 and South Carolina.'
2. See In re Low Cost Paralegal Servs., 19 A.3d 1229 (R.I. 2011). Among the findings were that:
Low Cost Paralegal Services and Dominique M. Salazar a/k/a Michelle Salazar have engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law in Rhode Island in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-27-12 by falsely holding
itself/herself out to Rhode Islanders, through internet advertising targeting Rhode Island, as competent
and qualified to prepare legal documents for uncontested divorce and to assist with a child support
problem, which conduct constitutes "the practice of law" as defined in § 11-27-2(4).
Id. at 1230.
3. See Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Mass., Inc. v. Nat'l Real Estate Info. Servs., 946 N.E.2d 665,
671 (Mass. 2011):
Nevertheless, we conclude that the closing or settlement of the types of real estate transactions
described in the record require not only the presence but the substantive participation of an
attorney on behalf of the mortgage lender, and that certain services connected with real prop-
erty conveyances constitute the practice of law in Massachusetts.
4. See, e.g., Creekmore v. Izard, 367 S.W.2d 419, 423-24 (Ark. 1963) (preparation of deeds,
mortgages, and bills of sale constitutes the practice of law); see also Pope Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. Suggs, 624
S.W.2d 828, 830-31 (Ark. 1981).
5. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Foreclosure Alternatives, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 971, 976 (Ohio 2010):
Based upon the facts in this case, we have no difficulty concluding that FAI, Alexakis, and
Lance Trester engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The general business plan adopted
by FAI as well as the specific handling of the Chandler matter and the foreclosure against the
second homeowner demonstrate that FAI, Alexakis, and Lance Trester (1) gave advice to
homeowners in the context of pending or threatened foreclosure proceedings, in particular,
advice concerning whether to continue making mortgage payments and the wisdom of legal
alternatives such as bankruptcy, (2) made representations to creditors on behalf of homeown-
ers facing foreclosure, and (3) evaluated for and with homeowners the terms and conditions of
settlement in the foreclosure proceedings.
6. See, e.g., Nieves v. All Star Title, Inc., 2010 WL 4227057, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2010),
affd, 21 A.3d 597 (Del. 2011), discussing the decision in In re Mid-Atlantic Settlement Servs., Inc., 755
A.2d 389, 389 (Del. 2000):
... which adopted the conclusions of the Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law that real
estate settlements constitute the practice of law, and that the closing of a loan secured by
Delaware real estate generally must be conducted by a Delaware attorney. All Star moved to
dismiss Nieves' Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Specifically, All Star denied that Nieves' Complaint established that it had breached any le-
gally-recognized duty or caused him cognizable damages. All Star also adopted the position
that Nieves' suit constituted an attempt to secure private enforcement of this state's rules
against the unauthorized practice of law.
7. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Coffey, 698 S.E.2d 244, 247-48 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010):
As early as 1987, lending institutions doing business in South Carolina were on notice that
they could not prepare legal documents in connection with a mortgage loan without review by
an independent attorney and that the loan closing had to be supervised by an attorney. See
State v. Buyers Serv. Co., 357 S.E.2d 15, 18-19 (S.C. 1987) (holding that a commercial title
company's employment of attorneys to review mortgage loan closing documents did not save
the company's preparation of those documents from constituting the unauthorized practice of
law and that the closings should be conducted only under an attorney's supervision), modified,
585 S.E.2d 773 (S.C. 2003); see also Doe Law Firm v. Richardson, 636 S.E.2d 866, 868 (S.C.
2006) (citing Buyers and McMaster) (clarifying that a lender may prepare legal documents for
use in financing or refinancing a real property loan as long as an independent attorney reviews
them and makes any corrections necessary to ensure their compliance with the law and reaf-
firming that mortgage loan closings should be conducted only under an attorney's
supervision).
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Lucy's posting about the issue itself may not trigger "unlawful prac-
tice" under these cases because she is not engaged in a closing and because
individuals have a right to represent themselves pro se in legal proceedings.
On the other hand, are Lucy's "Practical Tips" an attempt to "ghost-
write" pleadings for a potential pro se litigant?
Some courts have looked askance at this, indicating that "ghost-
writing" pleadings may be sanctionable.8 Some state bar associations have
banned "ghostwriting" pleadings and letters. For example, West Virginia
has an ethics opinion distinguishing between ghostwriting pleadings, which
is deemed inappropriate, with assisting a client in filling out forms, which is
However, in Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 113 S.W.3d 105, 121 (Ky. 2003), the
Kentucky Supreme Court declared:
We are asked today to decide an issue of first impression in this state. It is an issue of much
less breadth than the evidence adduced by the parties would suggest: Is conducting a real
estate closing the unauthorized practice of law? Based on our review of the evidence and
arguments presented to us, we hold that it is not the unauthorized practice of law for a layper-
son to conduct a real estate closing for another party.
8. See Couch v. Jabe, No. 7:09-cv-00434, 2010 WL 1416730, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Va. Apr. 8, 2010):
The court notes that plaintiff states in a footnote that he "asked counsel for Prison Legal News
to draft this motion on his behalf. They are Steven Rosenfield and Jeffrey Fogel . ... [Plain-
tiff] then revised counsels' draft motion." (Mot.(no.28) n. 1.) Although plaintiff's footnote
may have saved counsel from violating an ethical duty of candor, Virginia Legal Ethics Opin-
ion No. 1592 (1994), "ghostwriting" motions for a pro se plaintiff is contrary to the spirit of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the privilege of liberal construction afforded to pro se
litigants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a), (b). See also Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1272-73 (10th
Cir. 2001); Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comn'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1230-32 (D. Co. Nov. 17, 1994); Klein v. H.N. Whitney. Goadby
& Co., 341 F. Supp. 699, 702-03 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1971); Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg,
309 F. Supp. 341, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20,1970) (discussing ghostwriting and duty of candor).
"When appropriate, the court can make an additional inquiry in order to determine whether
[Rule 11] sanctions should be imposed on such persons, firms, or parties either in addition to
or, in unusual circumstances, instead of the person actually making the presentation to the
court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. For future reference, if an attorney
wishes to notify the court of parallel proceedings after a pro se party contacts him or her,
counsel is encouraged to file a letter with the court instead of drafting pleadings. Further
inquiry by the undersigned into plaintiff's allegations is presently unnecessary. However, any
additional instances or allegations of ghostwriting would be appropriately adjudicated.
Author's note: The Johnson case, discussed in the quotation above, was affirmed in part, although the
appellate court disclaimed the reasoning of the district court on other parts of this case when it eventu-
ally went on appeal. See Johnson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, Cnty. of Fremont, 85 F.3d 489, 494 (10th
Cir. 1996). The appellate court, however, did not specifically disapprove of the district court's following
statement:
Moreover, ghost-writing has been condemned as a deliberate evasion of the responsibilities
imposed on counsel by Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P.
What we fear is that in some cases actual members of the bar represent petitioners, informally
or otherwise, and prepare briefs for them which the assisting lawyers do not sign, and thus
escape the obligation imposed on members of the bar, typified by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, but which
exists in all cases, criminal as well as civil, of representing to the court that there is good
ground to support the assertions made. We cannot approve of such a practice. If a brief is
prepared in any substantial part by a member of the bar, it must be signed by him. We reserve
the right, where a brief gives occasion to believe that the petitioner has had legal assistance, to
require such signature, if such, indeed, is the fact. Such an evasion of the obligations imposed
upon counsel by statute, code and rule is ipso facto lacking in candor.
Johnson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231-32 (D. Co. 1994) (quoting Ellis v. Maine, 448
F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st. Cir. 1971)).
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deemed appropriate under certain circumstances.' The states that have is-
sued opinions on this are split, with some banning the practice, some limit-
ing the practice, and others agreeing it is permissible.'o It has been
reported that the online supplier of legal forms, LegalZoom, has entered
into a settlement of a case in Missouri, where LegalZoom was accused of
engaging in the unlawful practice of law." On the other hand, the ABA
has issued an ethics opinion indicating that ghostwriting is perfectly accept-
able and does not violate the RPC.12
9. See W. Va. Legal Ethics Op. 2010-01, Ghostwriting or Undisclosed Representation: What is
Permissible and What is Not Permissible, at 4 (2010), stating, in part, that "attorneys who write letters or
other documents on behalf of an individual do not have to disclose their identities if the letter or docu-
ment is not intended to be filed with a tribunal, or authorship is not otherwise required by law" (emphasis
added). Available at www.wvodc.org/pdf/lei/ghostwriting.pdf.
10. See Peter Geraghty, Ghostwriting, YOUR ABA (March 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/youraba/201103articlell.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2012):
There have been a number of state bar ethics opinions that pre-date the ABA Formal Opin-
ion. As discussed and cited in N.J. Advisory Committee on Prof'l Ethics Op. 713 (2008), some
of these opinions do not require disclosure. See L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass'n Prof'1 Responsibility
and Ethics Comm. Op. 502 (1999); L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass'n Prof'l Responsibility and Ethics
Comm. Op. 483 (1995) and State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof'1 Conduct Op. 05-
06 (2005).
Other opinions have found that ghostwriting is unethical per se. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of
Prof'1 Ethics and Conduct Op. 94-35 (1995); Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof'1 Ethics and Conduct
Op. 96-31 (1997); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof'1 and Judicial
Ethics Op. 1987-2 (1987); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics Op. 613 (1990).
Still other opinions find that there is a duty to disclose when the lawyer's assistance is exten-
sive, substantial or significant. See Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm. Op. 93-1 (1993); Conn.
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics Op. 98-5 (1998); Del. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l
Ethics Op. 1994-2 (1994); Fla. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'I Ethics Op. 79-7 (2000); Mass.
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics Op. 98-1 (1998); N.H. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Unbundled
Services - Assisting the Pro se Litigant (1999); Ky. Bar Ass'n Op. E-343 (1991); Utah State
Bar Ethics Comm. Op. 74 (1981).
11. Agreement Reached in Mo. Suit Against LegalZoom, SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN (Aug. 23,
2011), http://www.semissourian.com/story/1755328.html?response=no:
A proposed settlement has been reached in a federal class-action lawsuit against LegalZoom
Inc., the online vendor of legal forms and documents. The lawsuit had been scheduled go to
trial Monday in U.S. District Court in Jefferson City. But California-based LegalZoom has
announced an agreement in principle to settle the lawsuit that claimed the company wasn't
licensed to provide legal services in Missouri. LegalZoom says it contains no admission of
wrongdoing and lets the company continue offering services to Missouri residents with certain
changes.
12. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446 (2007) (a lawyer can
furnish ghostwriting assistance without disclosing to the court or to the opposing party under certain
circumstances):
Whether the lawyer must see to it that the client makes some disclosure to the tribunal (or
makes some disclosure independently) depends on whether the fact of assistance is material to
the matter, that is, whether the failure to disclose that fact would constitute fraudulent or
otherwise dishonest conduct on the part of the client, thereby involving the lawyer in conduct
violative of Rules 1.2(d), 3.3(b), 4.1(b), or 8.4(c). In our opinion, the fact that a litigant sub-
mitting papers to a tribunal on a pro se basis has received legal assistance behind the scenes is
not material to the merits of the litigation.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 31:281
III. INADVERTENT UNLAWFUL PRACTICE OF LAW ISSUES IF YOUR
SOCIAL MEDIA POSTINGS ARE VIEWED IN A STATE WHERE
You ARE NOT LICENSED TO PRACTICE
A. The Case of the Broadly-Read Lawyer
What if Lucy Lawyer (who made the postings described above) is li-
censed in State A, but her postings are broadly read across the country? Is
Lucy engaged in the unlawful practice of law in States B, C, and D?
B. Discussion on the Case of the Broadly-Read Lawyer
As can be seen by the materials in Part II above, what constitutes the
practice of law varies from state to state. Even if Lucy's activities are per-
fectly acceptable in State A, they may not be in States B, C, or D.
For example, at least one Florida court has held that selling legal forms
is acceptable and does not constitute the unlawful practice of law.14 On the
other hand, courts have found there to be a distinction between merely
supplying a form and helping someone fill out a form (even if the assistance
is electronic and on-line)-the latter (in some states) may constitute the
unlawful practice of law.15
13. See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace: Online Document Preparation and
the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 812 (2002).
14. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1978):
We hold that Ms. Brumbaugh, and others in similar situations, may sell printed material pur-
porting to explain legal practice and procedure to the public in general and she may sell sam-
ple legal forms. . . . In addition, Ms. Brumbaugh may advertise her business activities of
providing secretarial and notary services and selling legal forms and general printed informa-
tion. However, Marilyn Brumbaugh must not, in conjunction with her business, engage in
advising clients as to the various remedies available to them, or otherwise assist them in pre-
paring those forms necessary for a dissolution proceeding.
15. See, e.g., Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1062-63 (W.D. Mo. 2011):
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant LegalZoom argues that, as a matter of law, it
did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law in Missouri. Thus, the Court must decide
whether a reasonable juror could conclude that LegalZoom did engage in the unauthorized
practice of law, as it has been defined by the Missouri Supreme Court. See First Escrow, 840
S.W.2d at 843 n.7 ("the General Assembly may only assist the judiciary by providing penalties
for the unauthorized practice of law, the ultimate definition of which is always within the
province of this Court"); Eisel, 230 S.W.3d at 338-39 (reaffirming that "[t]he judiciary is neces-
sarily the sole arbiter of what constitutes the practice of law," and finding no conflict between
§ 484.020 and the Missouri judiciary's regulation of the practice of law).
Plaintiffs argue that the Missouri Supreme Court has declared on multiple occasions that
a non-lawyer may not charge a fee for their legal document preparation service. Defendant
responds that its customers-rather than LegalZoom itself-complete the standardized legal
documents by entering their information via the online questionnaire to fill the document's
blanks, which it concedes that customers never see. While the parties dispute the proper char-
acterization of the underlying facts, there is no dispute regarding how LegalZoom's legal doc-
ument service functions.
It is uncontroverted that Defendant LegalZoom's website performs two distinct func-
tions. First, the website offers blank legal forms that customers may download, print, and fill
in themselves. Plaintiffs make no claim regarding these blank forms. Indeed, this function is
analogous to the "do-it-yourself" kit in Thompson containing blank forms and general instruc-
tions regarding how those forms should be completed by the customer. Such a "do-it-your-
self' kit puts the legal forms into the hands of the customers, facilitating the right to pro se
representation.
It is the second function of LegalZoom's website that goes beyond mere general instruc-
tion. LegalZoom's internet portal is not like the "do-it-yourself" divorce kit in Thompson.
286
THE SOCIAL MEDIA THICKET
IV. INADVERTENT ATrORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS
A. The Case of the Too-Fast-to-Respond Lawyer
Arnie Attorney is a prolific user of Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter,
PartnerUp, 16 Ryze,' 7 Networking for Professionals," Jase,19 and Ziggs. 20
Arnie rapidly responds to any queries or comments and prides himself
on his fast turnaround and 24/365 availability. He wants to build his brand
as an attorney to as many people as possible.
Arnie gets the following query on one of the sites he maintains:
My house is in foreclosure. A guy I know promised that he
could stop the foreclosure for a $1,000 fee. I paid the fee
and the foreclosure is continuing. Any ideas on what I can
do now?
Concerned Homeowner
Arnie quickly responds with information about the FTC rule on loan
modifications and the liability of those who do not comply with the
rules.2 ' Has Arnie formed an attorney-client relationship with Concerned
Homeowner?
B. Discussion on the Case of the Too-Fast-to-Respond Lawyer
The general rule is that the attorney-client relationship is formed by
looking at what the client believed, not what the lawyer intended.22
Rather, LegalZoom's internet portal service is based on the opposite notion: we'll do it for
you. Although the named Plaintiffs never believed that they were receiving legal advice while
using the LegalZoom website, LegalZoom's advertisements shed some light on the manner in
which LegalZoom takes legal problems out of its customers' hands. While stating that it is not
a "law firm" (yet "provide[s] self-help services"), LegalZoom reassures consumers that "we'll
prepare your legal documents," and that "LegalZoom takes over" once customers "answer a






21. See Mortgage Assistance Relief Services, 16 C.F.R. § 322 (2010); see also FTC Issues Final
Rule to Protect Struggling Homeowners from Mortgage Relief Scams, FTC (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.
ftc.gov/opa/2010/11/mars.shtm.
22. Cydney Tune & Marley Degner, Blogging and Social Networking: Current Legal Issues, in
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW INSTITUTE 2009: WEB 2.0 AND THE FUTURE OF MOBILE COMPUTING:
PRIVACY, BLOGs, DATA BREACHES, ADVERTISING, AND PORTABLE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 113(2009):
In general, courts and other disciplinary bodies have found that an attorney-client relationship
exists when the client reasonably relies on the advice of the attorney. The test focuses on the
client's subjective perceptions and beliefs. Attorneys must take care that undesired attorney-
client relationships are not unwittingly formed by blogging or maintaining a profile on a social
networking site.
Attorney blogs and social networking profiles should contain a disclaimer, making it clear that
information provided on the blog or social networking site is not intended to create an attor-
ney-client relationship. Disclaimers of any and all liability that might arise from the contents
of the blog or social networking profile could also be used. However, such provisions may not
be enforceable unless a user affirmatively accepts the terms. Disclaimers are also likely to be
unenforceable if they are inconsistent with the subsequent conduct of the parties.
2012] 287
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Articles have cautioned about how the Internet can lead to inadver-
tent attorney-client relationships. 23
Can Arnie prevent an inadvertent attorney-client relationship if he
puts a disclaimer in every posting?24 RPC 1.2 states: "A lawyer may limit
the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the
circumstances and the client gives informed consent";2 1 "informed consent
denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after
the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about
the material risks and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed
course of conduct." 26 Can Arnie even craft an appropriate disclaimer? If
he does, does it undermine his marketing efforts? Does it make his posting
less likely to be read?
Moreover, if Arnie has created an attorney-client relationship, he now
has at least five additional problems.
First, his "public" posting of advice to Concerned Homeowner may
have created a breach in Arnie's duty of confidentiality to the client.2 7
ABA Model Rule 1.6 and Mississippi Rule 1.6 are essentially the same.
Once an attorney-client relationship has been formed, the duty of confi-
dentiality attaches. The comment to Mississippi Rule 1.6 cautions that a
"fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the ab-
sence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal informa-
tion relating to the representation." 28
Second, Arnie's posting may have violated rules on contacts with pro-
spective clients. ABA Model Rule 7.3 prohibits "real-time electronic con-
tact" to "solicit professional employment" from someone with whom the
23. See, e.g., Carrie Pixler & Lori A. Higuera, Social Media: Ethical Challenges Create Need for
Law Firm Policies, 47 ARIz. ATrORNEY 34, 35 (2011); Abigail S. Crouse & Michael C. Flom, Social
Media for Lawyers, 67 BENCH AND B. OF MINN. 16, 17 (2010); Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client
Relationships in Cyberspace The Peril and the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 168 (1999); Ann Massie
Nelson, Internet Communication Raises Questions about Attorney-Client Relationship: Is a Visitor to
Your Firm's Homepage Your Client? Possibly, 69 Wis. LAW 25, 25 (1996).
24. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R.1.2(c) (2011).
26. Id. R. 1.0(e)
27. For more on this, see Andrea Utecht & Abraham C. Reich, 2 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING
BETWEEN INSIDE & OUTSIDE COUNSEL, § 31:20 n.10 (2011):
See, e.g., Cal. State Bar Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct Op. No. 2005-168 (when
lawyer maintains a web site allowing visitors who are seeking legal advice a means of commu-
nicating with him, lawyer owes a duty of confidentiality to the visitors unless a disclaimer
exists in sufficiently plain terms to defeat visitors' reasonable belief that the lawyer is consult-
ing confidentially with the visitor); Nev. Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility Op. 32
(Mar. 25, 2005) (attorney/client relationship may be created by a unilateral act in response to
an advertisement or e-mail to an attorney's website); and S.D. State Bar Ethics Op. 2002-2
(April 22, 2002) (e-mail from prospective client can create attorney/client relationship).
Changes in technology have also complicated this issue. For instance, several opinions have
considered attorney postings on listservs, N.M. Ad. Op. 2001-1 and L.A. County Bar Ass'n
Prof'1 Responsibility and Ethics Comm. Op. No. 514 (2005).
28. Miss. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.6 cmt. (2011).
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lawyer does not previously have a "close personal or prior professional re-
lationship." 29 Also, see the comments elsewhere in this Paper about the
Mississippi advertising rules.
Third, Arnie's response to Concerned Homeowner may have triggered
a conflict of interest. Without knowing exactly who the Concerned Home-
owner is, who the lender is, or who else might have an interest in the prop-
erty, Arnie cannot clear conflicts and thus may have violated Model Rules
1.7 and 1.9. Note, however, that the Mississippi versions of Rule 1.7 and
1.9 differ substantially from the ABA Model Rules.
Fourth, Arnie's quick response may constitute the unlawful practice of
law in the state where the Concerned Homeowner resides, a state where
Arnie is not licensed to practice. If Arnie quickly responds to Concerned
Homeowner's query without obtaining more information, how can Arnie
know where Concerned Homeowner is domiciled or where the property is
located?
Fifth, if Arnie is held to have created attorney-client relationship but
has given bad advice, will he be covered by his malpractice insurance?"o
V. WHEN DOES USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA CONSTITUTE ADVERTISING?
A. The Case of the Clever Firm Name
Billie "BullDog" Barrister maintains a website for his firm, Barrister,
Barrister, and Solicitor. The URL for the website is "Bulldoglawyer.com"
and on the front page of the website is this statement:
You need a fighter on your side in the courtroom. Bar-
rister, Barrister, and Solicitor are bulldog lawyers who'll
fight to protect your rights!
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 7.3 (2011).
30. See Christine D. Petruzzell, Don't Go Blindly Into That Law Blog, 250 N.J. LAW. 80, 82
(2008):
In New Jersey, this is illustrated by the controversy triggered in early 2007 by the Chubb
Group of Insurance Companies, one of the largest carriers of lawyers' professional liability
insurance. Initially, upon learning of a law blog proposed by a New Jersey firm, Chubb de-
clined to provide coverage, stating that "this is not a risk they are interested in undertaking."
Shortly thereafter, Chubb modified its position, stating that it would insure this new form of
communication "within select parameters."
Chubb distinguished between what it described as an "informational blog," that presents
information or provides a forum for the discussion of issues in a neutral way, and an "advisory
blog," by which a law firm offers advice, for example through a question and answer format,
and often being interactive, potentially establishing attorney-client relationships that can lead
to malpractice suits. Although Chubb stated that its underwriters would evaluate each sub-
mission on its own merits, Chubb suggested that it may not provide coverage on what it
deemed to be an "advisory blog," which, by its nature, increases the risk of a malpractice
lawsuit against the firm.
Referencing the risks presented by advisory blogs, Chubb noted it is often difficult to
perform conflict checks, and that comments/questions are posed by consumers in states where
the attorney may not be licensed to practice. In contrast, Chubb noted that informational
blogs, which it defined as a forum for discussion of issues in a neutral unbiased way, "pose a
minimal level of risk from Chubb's underwriting perspective."
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There is no indication on Billie's firm's homepage of the states in
which its lawyers are licensed to practice. Every one of Billie's Tweets and
Facebook responses has this signature:
Billie "Bulldog" Lawyer, an expert litigator.
www.bulldoglawyer.com.
Does Billie's signature line constitute improper advertising? Does the
link to his website create any ethical problems? Is the URL itself a viola-
tion of any rule?
B. Discussion on the Case of the Clever Firm Name
While the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit Internet
advertising," the ABA Rules do not specifically address the form or con-
tents of such advertising, other than prohibiting false and deceptive adver-
tising3 2 and prohibiting direct electronic communications with potential
clients under limited circumstances. 33
The Mississippi Supreme Court has noted the tension between allow-
ing lawyers to advertise while prohibiting unlawful solicitation of clients34
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 7.2(a) (2011): "Subject to the requirements of Rules
7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through written, recorded or electronic communication,
including public media."
32. Id. R. 7.1: "A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer
or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresenta-
tion of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially
misleading."
33. Id. R. 7.3(a)-(b) (emphasis added):
(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact solicit pro-
fessional employment from a prospective client when a significant motive for the lawyer's
doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain, unless the person contacted:
(1) is a lawyer; or
(2) has a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with the lawyer.
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a prospective client by written,
recorded or electronic communication or by in-person, telephone or real-time electronic
contact even when not otherwise prohibited by paragraph (a), if:
(1) the prospective client has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the
lawyer; or
(2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment.
34. Mississippi Bar v. Turnage, 919 So. 2d 36, 40-41 (Miss. 2005):
This Court has previously stated that "[s]olicitation has never been recognized as beneficial to
the profession or to the client. It has the potential for creating litigation, creating fraudulent
claims, and turning our profession from one of service to one of profit. Solicitation can result
in a diminished status for the lawyer and be harmful to the profession's reputation." Emil v.
Miss. Bar, 690 So. 2d 301, 327 (Miss. 1997). Notwithstanding this clear statement of potential
harm, this Court found that Emil's multiple acts of solicitation, without more, would warrant
only a public reprimand. FN8. These concerns should apply equally to prohibit paying others
to locate prospective clients, recommend a lawyer's services, and obtain those prospective
clients' signatures on professional service agreements.
FN8. Writing for the majority in Emil, Presiding Justice Sullivan wisely noted the dilemma
caused by case law allowing lawyers to advertise for clients while at the same time continuing
to hold that solicitation is a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, stating that "[tjhe
Bar's official position on solicitation is difficult in light of the Bar's position on advertising."
690 So. 2d at 327.
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and has revoked the pro hac status of an out-of-state lawyer who had
advertised on Mississippi television for clients."
Mississippi's version of Rule 7.2 differs substantially from the ABA
Model Rule. It begins by defining advertising as "an active quest for clients
involving a public or non-public communication," which includes "com-
puter-accessed communications."" The comments to Mississippi Rule 7.2
indicate that the advertising restrictions apply to a lawyer's presence on the
web. If a lawyer's web posting (be it a Facebook posting, a tweet, or a
blog) is held to be an advertisement, then Mississippi Rule 7.2 not only
regulates the permissible communications that may be made, but it also
requires that the law firm submit copies to the Office General Counsel of
the Mississippi Bar Association for prior evaluation under the provisions of
Mississippi Rule 7.5.13 While "static" or "passive" Internet web pages ap-
pear to be exempt from the prior submission rule," nothing in the rule
seems to exempt postings on Facebook or LinkedIn, tweets on Twitter, or
blogs.
Mississippi is not the only state to regulate advertising on websites.
Numerous state bars and state courts also regulate advertising and firm
websites. In the words of a California Bar Formal Opinion: "There is no
certain method or form of notice that provides assurance that an attorney's
Internet web site will not be found to be an advertisement, holding oneself
out as available to practice law or the unauthorized practice of law in other
35. See In re Williamson, 838 So. 2d 226, 229 (Miss. 2002).
36. Miss. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 7.2 (2011).
37. The comment to Rule 7.2 provides, in part:
One developing area of communications to which the rules relating to communications about
lawyers' services are intended to apply is computer-accessed communications. For purposes of
this rule, "computer-accessed communications" are defined as information regarding a law-
yer's or law firm's services that is read, viewed, or heard directly through the use of a com-
puter. Computer-accessed communications include, but are not limited to, Internet presences
such as home pages or World Wide Web sites, unsolicited electronic mail communications, and
information concerning a lawyer's or law firm's services that appears on World Wide Web
search engine screens and elsewhere.
38. Miss. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 7.2(h).
39. See id R. 7.5(b)(8); see also Miss. Bar Ethics Op. No. 252 (April 22, 2005). For a discussion
of what constitutes a "passive" website for jurisdictional purposes, see Eldred v. Fleming, 56 So. 3d 432
(La. Ct. App. 2011).
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jurisdictions."4 0  Each state's rules are distinct, 4 1 and many state bar as-
sociations have issued formal opinions on the use of the Internet and ad-
vertising. See, for example, state bar advertising rules in Arizona,4 2
Louisiana,4 3 Virginia,4 and Florida.4 5 New Jersey has issued an ethics
opinion that a lawyer who participates in a web service that directs poten-
tial clients to a local lawyer violates the state bar's advertising prohibi-
tions.4 6 In addition, some states have indicated that a URL itself may
constitute a violation of the advertising rules.47
40. See Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility & Conduct Formal Op. No. 2001-155,
which includes this statement:
This leaves two options for California attorneys who maintain Internet web sites for their law
practices. They can choose to use their web site to advertise in multiple jurisdictions. This is
not necessarily inappropriate, but it requires that they assure themselves that they are comply-
ing with any applicable rules of the different jurisdictions involved, including rules governing
the unauthorized practice of law (assuming that there is no inconsistency in the applicable
rules that would make this impossible). Alternatively, they can take steps to make clear that
they are not advertising in other jurisdictions.
There is no certain method or form of notice that provides assurance that an attorney's In-
ternet web site will not be found to be an advertisement, holding oneself out as available to
practice law or the unauthorized practice of law in other jurisdictions. We make the following
suggestions as examples of the kind of statements which, if accurate, might assist in avoiding
regulation in other jurisdictions: 1) an explanation of where the attorney is licensed to practice
law, 2) a description of where the attorney maintains law offices and actually practices law, 3)
an explanation of any limitation on the courts in which the attorney is willing to appear, and 4)
a statement that the attorney does not seek to represent anyone based solely on a visit to the
attorney's web site.
41. See, e.g., Adam R. Bialek, Paris A. Gunther & Scott M. Smedresman, Attorney Web Sites:
Ethical Issues Are Only the Beginning, 81 N.Y. ST. B.J. 10 (2009).
42. State Bar of Ariz. Ethics Op. 97-04 (1997).
43. LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 7.6 (2011).
44. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 7.2 (2011).
45. FLA. BAR R. 4-7.4 to 7.8 (2012).
46. See N.J. Comm. on Attorney Adver. Op. 43, 1-2 (June 2011), available at http://www.elawy-
eringredux.com/New%20Jersey%2OTotal%20Attorneys%20Decision.pdf. The opinion stated:
The Internet company offers a group of websites concerning bankruptcy. The websites in-
clude general information about what debts may be discharged and the difference between a
chapter 7 and chapter 13 bankruptcy, and offers to connect visitors to the website ("Users")
with a bankruptcy attorney. Respondents stated that the company takes actions to ensure that
its websites have a high ranking on various Internet search engines ("search engine
optimization").
The Committee focused on one specific website with which the New Jersey attorneys were
participating. Attorneys who participate in this website pay for the exclusive rights to a geo-
graphical area, by zip code. When a User seeking an attorney provides his or her zip code and
contact information, the website will identify the sole participating attorney for the pertinent
geographical area.
The website does not inform the User that the search for a bankruptcy attorney is completed
the moment he or she inputs a zip code. Rather, the website home page invites the User to
"get a free evaluation from a local bankruptcy attorney" by filling out a form. The website
states that "step 1 of 5" for the free evaluation is to provide the User's zip code and select a
reason for considering bankruptcy. The website explains that the User must provide the zip
code because "the law varies from state to state."
47. See James M. McCauley, Ethics: Managing Today's New Internet Risks, 2003 WL 23924287, at
*1-2 (March 6, 2003) (footnotes omitted). This article states:
The ethical rules governing a law firm's use of a domain name draw from the rules applicable
to the use of "trade names." Under Rule 7.5(a) a "trade name" used by a private law firm
cannot imply a connection with a government agency or with a public or charitable legal ser-
vices organization. Domain names may be regarded as "professional designations" subject to
Rule 7.5 (a). Therefore, it would be improper for a private firm to use the primary domain of
".org" or ".gov." Instead, a private law firm must use a URL with the ".com" designation.
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The federal courts have gotten involved, and there are two decisions in
the last eighteen months from the Second4 8 and Fifth Circuits49 on what
form of regulation of lawyer advertising is permissible. In addition, there
are even indications that a blog by a lawyer may be deemed advertising in
some circumstances.50
VI. POSSIBLE "INAPPROPRIATE" OR EVEN SANCTIONABLE USAGE OF
SOCIAL MEDIA IMPACTING LITIGATORS; FIRST AMENDMENT
ISSUES VS. A LAWYER'S OBLIGATIONS AS AN
OFFICER OF THE COURT
A. The Case of the Disgruntled Litigator
Billie "BullDog" Barrister is in the midst of a lengthy trial. Judge Ai-
leen Tudor Sentor, at the close of the day's hearing, issued a ruling that
Bulldog is convinced is dead wrong and constitutes obvious reversible
error.
Bulldog, on his way out of the courthouse, pauses on the courthouse
steps to Tweet (which is linked to his Facebook page):
Judge Sentor today demonstrated what everyone knows; her
rulings will always be overturned on appeal.
That evening, in his office, Bulldog angrily posts the following state-
ment on his Facebook page:
Judge Sentor issues rulings that are either the result of her
ignorance of the law or her incompetence.
Virginia's Standing Committee on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation (SCOLAS) has stated
that it is misleading and deceptive for an attorney or attorneys to advertise using a corporate,
trade, or fictitious name unless the attorney or attorneys actually practice under such name.
The usage of a corporate, trade, or fictitious name should include, among other things, display-
ing such name on the letterhead, business cards, and office sign.
By using the domain name to identify the firm's website, the domain name is a form of public
communication regarding the lawyers' services and therefore the domain name is subject to
Rule 7.1's prohibition against false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive claims or statements.
The Supreme Court of Ohio's Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline issued
Ethics Opinion 99-4 (June 4, 1999) which specifically addresses domain names. The opinion
states that it is not improper for an attorney to use a domain name different from the law
firm's actual name, provided that the domain name is not a "false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement." In addition, the domain name cannot "imply
special competence or experience." Thus, for example, a domain names such as "divorcesqui-
ckandcheap.com" or "personalinjuryspecialists.com" would violate the cited rules.
48. Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 92-95 (2d Cir. 2010).
49. Public Citizen Inc. v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2011).
50. See Leigh Jones, Will Law Firm Blogs Be Regulated as Advertising?, NAT'L L.J. (October 11,
2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1160471119300. Also see Judy M. Cornett, The Ethics of
Blawging: A Genre Analysis, 41 Loy. U. Ci. L.J. 221 (2009), which cites, among other sources, Sarah
Hale, Lawyers at the Keyboard: Is Blogging Advertising and If So, How Should It Be Regulated?, 20
GEO. J. LEGAL Emics 669 (2007); Connor Mullin, Regulating Legal Advertising on the Internet: Blogs,
Google & Super Lawyers, 20 GEo. J. LEGAL Erics 835 (2007); Adrienne E. Carter, Blogger Beware:
Ethical Considerations for Legal Blogs, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5 (2007); and Justin Krypel, A New
Frontier or Merely a New Medium? An Analysis of the Ethics of Blawgs, 14 MicH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 457 (2008).
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Has Bulldog done anything for which he can be sanctioned by the
Court? Has he done anything that violates the Rules of Professional Con-
duct? Are his statements protected by the First Amendment?
Would the answer to this be any different if Bulldog had put on his
Facebook page:
There is a judge in this state who issues rulings that always
demonstrate her ignorance of the law or her incompetence.
Email me if you want more information.
B. Discussion of the Case of the Disgruntled Litigator
Courts clearly have the inherent powers to punish lawyers for behav-
ior that does not violate state or federal statutes or court rules. Courts
have sanctioned and disbarred lawyers for improperly accusing a judge of
incompetence and bias.52
There is always a tension between the "robust debate" that the First
Amendment allows and improper criticism of the court by an officer of the
court.5 3 Lawyers, however, have a duty under RPC 8.2 not to make false
51. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 33 (1991).
52. See In re Evans, 801 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir. 1986), where a lawyer was disbarred for criticiz-
ing a judge without investigating the basis of the charge, stating that the "failure to investigate, coupled
with his unrelenting reassertion of the charges . . . convincingly demonstrates his lack of integrity and
fitness to practice law." Evans also stated:
A court has the inherent authority to disbar or suspend lawyers from practice. In re Snyder,
472 U.S. 634, 105 S.Ct. 2874, 2880, 86 L.Ed.2d 504 (1985). This authority is derived from the
lawyer's role as an officer of the court. Id. Moreover, as an appellate court, we owe substan-
tial deference to the district court in such matters:
On one hand, the profession of an attorney is of great importance to an individual, and the
prosperity of his whole life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to
be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other, it is extremely desirable that the
respectability of the bar should be maintained, and that its harmony with the bench should
be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion, ought to reside in
the court. This discretion ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment; but it
must be exercised; and no other tribunal can decide, in a case of removal from the bar, with
the same means of information as the court itself.
Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 529-30, 6 L.Ed. 152 (1824). See also, In re: G.L.S., 745
F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1984). In this case, we can only conclude that the district court's disbarment
of Evans, based on his violation of the rules of professional conduct, is amply supported by the
record and did not exceed the limits of the court's discretion.
Evans' letter, accusing Magistrate Smalkin of incompetence and/or religious and racial bias,
was unquestionably undignified, discourteous, and degrading. Moreover, it was written while
the Brown case was on appeal to this Court and was thus properly viewed by the district court
as an attempt to prejudice the administration of justice in the course of the litigation.
Id.
53. See, e.g., Fieger v. Thomas, 872 F. Supp. 377, 385 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (quoting Standing Comm.
on Discipline v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1395 (C.D. Cal. 1994)) (emphasis in original):
It is a rare and unfortunate day when the judges of this district must sanction an attorney for
conduct involving criticism of the bench. Robust debate regarding judicial performance is es-
sential to a vital judiciary. If an attorney, after reasonable inquiry, has comments about a
judicial officer's fitness for service, he or she may and should express them publicly. Con-
versely, baseless factual allegations contribute nothing to judicial accountability and under-
mine public trust in the courts.
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or reckless statements about a judge,54 and courts have tended to enforce
Rule 8.2 sanctions even when the lawyer has claimed that his or her activi-
ties or words were protected by the First Amendment. 5 Other courts also
have found that, as an officer of the court, an attorney's First Amendment
rights may be more limited than the public's,5 6 and the U.S. Supreme Court
has cautioned lawyers who have argued that their First Amendment rights
may not be circumscribed by their status as attorneys.
For example, lawyers have been sanctioned for language used in their
court filings, including unfounded allegations of ex parte contacts, for
statements accusing courts of ignoring the law to achieve a result,59 for
54. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 8.2(a) (2011):
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disre-
gard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory
officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal
office.
55. See, e.g., Bd. of Prof'1 Responsibility, Wyo. State Bar v. Davidson, 205 P.3d 1008, 1013-16
(Wyo. 2009); Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 890 A.2d 509, 512-15 (Conn. 2006).
56. See, e.g., In re Pyle, 156 P.3d 1231, 1242 (Kan. 2007):
In re Johnson, 240 Kan. 334, 729 P.2d 1175 (1986), was a contested case in which this court
found that Johnson should be disciplined for false, unsupported criticisms and misleading
statements about his opponent in a county attorney election campaign. In its discussion of the
First Amendment and lawyer speech, this court said:
A lawyer, as a citizen, has a right to criticize a judge or other adjudicatory officer publicly.
To exercise this right, the lawyer must be certain of the merit of the complaint, use appropri-
ate language, and avoid petty criticisms. Unrestrained and intemperate statements against a
judge or adjudicatory officer lessen public confidence in our legal system. Criticisms moti-
vated by reasons other than a desire to improve the legal system are not justified. Johnson,
240 Kan. at 336, 729 P.2d 1175.
Our Johnson case also stands for the proposition that a lawyer cannot insulate himself or
herself from discipline by characterizing questionable statements as opinions.
57. See In re Cobb, 838 N.E.2d 1197, 1210-11 (Mass. 2005):
The Supreme Court has said that it is unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a
judicial proceeding, whatever right to "free speech" an attorney has is extremely circum-
scribed. . . . Even outside the courtroom, a majority of the Court in two separate opinions in
the case of In re Sawyer, observed that lawyers in pending cases were subject to ethical restric-
tions on speech to which an ordinary citizen would not be. The Court went on to say that "the
speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demand-
ing standard than that established for regulation of" other kinds of speech protected by the
First Amendment. Id. at 1074, 111 S.Ct. 2720.
58. See, e.g., Davidson, where a lawyer was sanctioned for, among other things, putting the fol-
lowing language into a court filing:
How can an attorney have gotten a trial date from a judge who was not assigned to the case?
That could only be done by having engaged in improper ex parte communications with the
court.
It is obvious enough that Respondent filed his reassignment motion to achieve a procedural
and tactical advantage. Yet no one notified the Petitioner of opposing counsel's communica-
tions with [the] Judges . . . at the time those communications occurred much less took any
action to determine whether Petitioner would stipulate to the reassignment of the case or to
the trial date.
It has been rumored that if one is affiliated with [opposing counsel's law firm], favoritism may
be accorded her by [the judge] or those in his office. Because opposing counsel is with the law
firm [ ], Petitioner believes that favoritism was at play here.
205 P.3d at 1012-13 (emphasis removed).
59. See In re Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d 714, 715-716 (Ind. 2002), modified, 782 N.E.2d 985 (Ind. 2003),
where an appellate lawyer stated in a brief:
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statements in a letter that a judge is "an embarrassment to this commu-
nity,""o and for Internet postings containing unfounded accusations against
a judge.6
VII. "OWNERSHIP" OF SOCIAL MEDIA INFORMATION WHEN A
LAWYER LEAVES A FIRM
A. The Case of the Firm-Hopping Lawyer
Jenn Exer is a hotshot young attorney who has been an outstanding
associate. In her first three years of practice she reworked the firm's blog
and made hundreds of postings to it. Some of the postings she wrote were
unattributed while others carried her byline. In addition, the firm has a
Facebook page, and Jenn worked with the firm's marketing staff on it.
Jenn has now been recruited by and moved to a huge, multi-state firm.
She wants to "take" all her blog postings with her and put them on her new
firm's website. She says, "After all, the ones with my byline are mine,
right?"
What do you advise Jenn? What would you advise her former law
firm? Would it matter if the firm had a policy that everything a lawyer did
in the legal arena while an employee was for the firm? Would it matter if,
while she was an associate at the firm, Jenn also maintained her own, pri-
vate blog where she put additional "legal" postings?
B. Discussion of the Case of the Firm-Hopping Lawyer
Some have asserted the ownership "of a material in a blog should be
assessed no differently from ownership of any other works of author-
ship."6 2 Thus, many authors on the subject look to general copyright law.6 3
Therefore, questions that arise include:
* Did the firm have a rule on access to and use of the blog
and its Facebook page?
* What were the expectations of the authors of each
posting?
The Court of Appeals' published Opinion in this case is quite disturbing. It is replete with
misstatements of material facts, it misapplies controlling case law, and it does not even bother
to discuss relevant cases that are directly on point. Clearly, such a decision should be re-
viewed by this Court. Not only does it work an injustice on appellant Michigan Mutual Insur-
ance Company, it establishes dangerous precedent in several areas of the law. This will
undoubtedly create additional problems in future cases.
Indeed, the Opinion is so factually and legally inaccurate that one is left to wonder whether
the Court of Appeals was determined to find for Appellee Sports, Inc., and then said whatever
was necessary to reach that conclusion (regardless of whether the facts or the law supported its
decision).
60. Notopoulos, 890 A.2d at 512 n.4.
61. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Wrona, 908 A.2d 1281, 1289-90 (Pa. 2006).
62. Lisa M. Brownlee, ASSETS & FINANCE: AUDITS AND VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY § 5:85 (2011).
63. See Jon M. Garon, Wiki Authorship, Social Media and the Curatorial Audience, 1 HARV. J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 95 (2010).
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* How can a "poster" to a blog or firm Internet site protect
his or her interest in what is posted?
* What are the reasonable expectations of the firm, and
what are the contractual or other obligations it imposes
on its employees?
VIII. CONCLUSION
Lawyers who are not using social media are being left behind as more
and more people employ this media as their primary means of obtaining
information and interacting with others. Lawyers who use social media,
however, need to be cautious so that they are not ensnared by the thicket
of ethical rules that might apply.

